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Theft, Law and Society- 1968
by Jerome Hall
THE PRESIDENT'S Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice has reported that "burglary,
automobile theft, and larceny of $50
and over make up 87 percent of Index
crimes",l i.e., of the crimes listed in
the Uniform Crime Reports published
by the F.B.I. This excludes robbery
and, more important as regards theft,
millions of petty thefts as well as the
numerous frauds and embezzlements,
all of which are not included in the
Uniform, Crime Reports. Statistical gen-
eralization about crime in hazardous,
but for the sole purpose of blocking
out the contours of the picture, it
seems safe to say that of all the gen.
uinely criminal acts committed in this
country, 90 per cent are crimes against
property. One thinks directly of the
billions of dollars these crimes involve
annually and then, in a more reflective
mood, of the moral implications of this
phenomenon. For, as an English
scholar recently said, "In our society
property has become an extension of
personality and violation of it consti.
tutes a violation of the self." 2
There are many other reasons to
study theft and the law concerning it.
Crimes of violence are more dramatic
and enlist widespread interest and
reaction: and they frequently involve
emotion or mental disease. Theft is re-
stricted to voluntary conduct that is
often deliberate and sometimes very
The law of theft has long been the most complicated branch of
the criminal law, writes Mr. Hall, and this is so in the face of the fact
that crimes against property can he estimated safely as accounting for
90 per cent of all genuine crime in this country. The Model Penal
Code has done much to simplify the law of theft and to eliminate
outmoded distinctions, the author concedes, but he maintains that
distinctions still must be recognized among the various types of
theft, the persons involved in theft and the appropriate penalties for
various crimes against property. Improvement, he concludes, demands
further and better research.
carefully planned; yet, except in rare
cases, public opinion is relatively indif-
ferent. A far higher percentage of
crimes of violence is "cleared" by the
arrest of suspects than in the case of
theft. The instinct to live has long been
a constant, simple factor, and the ways
of killing human beings are relatively
few. But economies differ greatly, and
they have long histories marked by
many changes reflected in numerous
inventions and the production of a
great variety of goods. The methods of
misappropriation are correspondingly
complex. In no other field of the crimi-
nal law does private adjudication and
co-operation-by employers, insurance
companies and protective associations
-operate as widely and importantly as
in that of theft. Gaps between the law
of theft and relevant values sometimes
become very wide, and then one en-
counters those strange statutory in-
terpretations about which the canons
of construction are wholly silent. All of
this and much else combine to provide
fascinating opportunities for studies
that can be very helpful in the im-
provement of the administration of
criminal justice.
The Model Penal Code
and Subsequent Enactments
The law of theft has long been the
most technical branch of the criminal
law. But now we have the theft provi-
sions of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code, the recent enact-
ment of theft statutes based on the
code in New York, Illinois, Wisconsin,
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is drawn from
an address presented at the meeting of the
Maryland State's Attorneys Association in
Baltimore, December 15. 1967.
1. Tsm C14ALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 19 (1967.) The cormunission concluded
that, "The number of offenses-crimes of
violence, crimes against property and most
others as well-has been increasing . . .
"Most forms of crime-especially crimes
against property-are increasing faster than
population growth." Id, at 30.
2. TERENCE MoRs, in CHANGING CONCEcTS OF
CRIME AND iTs TREATMENT 23-24 (itare ed.
1966).
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Minnesota, Indiana and other states,
and the 1967 proposed Michigan bill.
What is the significance of these pro-
posed and enacted changes?
When I wrote Thejt, Law and So-
ciety in 1935 it was plain that in trying
to answer" so apparently simple a ques-
tion as, what can be 'stolen', [one]
would be introduced into a labyrin-
thian network of legal propositions
woven into innumerable statutes and
cases", and "that the rules... have be-
come so highly involved, numerous
and technical that they are extremely
difficult to apply competently... .2
That was no discovery Stephen had
implied as much in 1863. And if, to
the technicality of the common law on
the subject of larceny is added that of
the distinctions among the various
types of larceny and of the other
forms of theft, the need to eliminate
the excessive complexity of this branch
of the law is obvious.
This law had also accumulated var-
ious historical accidents such as Coke's
exclusion of instruments representing
choses in action from the subject mat-
ter of larceny. There were other parts
of the law, e.g., the distinction of lar-
ceny by trick from false pretenses and
the exclusion of Jerae naturae and of
noncorporeal property., which, though
justifiable when adopted, later became
indefensible. And there were proce-
dural difficulties, especially in the cases
where one property crime was charged
and another proved and convictions
were set aside on the ground of vari-
ance.
In all of the above respects the
Model Penal Code and the new statutes
have made important gains. The thick
underbrush has been cut away, the law
has been simplified, outmoded distinc-
tions have been abandoned and the
above procedural problem apparently
has been solved. I say "apparently" be-
cause the language in some of the new
statutes and recent court decisions
raises doubts. Long before the recent
theft laws, the joinder of property
crimes was allowed, and in California,
which led the way, the prosecution can
simply charge theft. But it is still nec-
essary to prove a particular common
law crime and there is, accordingly, lit-
tle likelihood that law students and
lawyers will soon be able to escape the
discipline of that difficult subject. Under
the new statutes, when "theft" can be
charged, the prosecution may be com-
pelled to file answers to a bill of parti-
culars. The net gain in procedure is
therefore problematic.
That the old problem of variance re-
quires very careful handling is shown
in the recent Indiana decision in
Coates, 229 N.E. 2d 640 (Sup. Ct.
1967). In that case, the information
charged theft by receiving, while the
evidence showed that the defendant stole
the property. The Indiana Criminal
Code §10-3029, which is part of the
Offenses Against Property Act pro-
vides: "The general purpose of this
act ... is to unify several traditionally
distinct offenses against person and
property in order to eliminate pointless
procedural obstacles to the conviction
of thieves and swindlers. Specifically, it
is the purpose of this act to consolidate
all of the theft group of crimes except
robbery. . .-4 Despite that provision,
the Indiana Supreme Court said, "The
question is whether under the Theft
Code there is one crime of theft ...or
whether there are various forms of
theft .... " The court noted that Calif or-
nia and New York had made "specific
provisions to determine these proce-
dural matters". Because there is no
such provision in the new Indiana stat-
ute, the conviction was reversed.
The Model Penal Code and the re-
cent statutes also have recommended
or made new substantive laws, and
these raise more difficult questions.
Few, I think, doubt that the inclusion
of noncorporeal property is an impor-
tant advance. That the case of one who
intentionally made illegal use of anoth-
er's machinery is indistinguishable on
the merits from the larceny of tangible
goods seems clear. It remains to be
seen whether the exclusion of the in-
fringement of trademarked products
was sound.
On the other hand, serious doubts
may well be entertained about the pro-
vision in the code and several of the
new statutes concerning taking or exer-
cising unlawful "control" over the
moveable property of another. 5 "Con-
trol" is not a common law term in a
technical sense, nor is it defined in
some of the new statutes. Illinois, Indi-
ana and the proposed Michigan bill de-
fine "obtains or exerts control" in cer-
tain common law terms, but they add
that "control" "includes but is not lim-
ited to" those terms. "Control" is dis-
cussed in the comments in the A.L.I.'s
first and second tentative drafts (1953
and 1954). The problem was compli-
cated by the draftsmen's desire to cre-
ate a single offense "embracing ... lar-
ceny, embczzlcment, false pretense, ex-
tortion, blackmail, fraudulent conver-
sion, receiving stolen property, and the
like".6 "Control" apparently was taken
as the common concept running
through all of those crimes "and the
like".
Since it is certainly possible that
"control" will be challenged on well-
known grounds of due process concern-
ing the definiteness of criminal stat-
utes, the term merits careful attention.
The code comments7 make it clear that
the draftsmen reject "asportation" as
essential to theft on the psychological
ground that the removal of a chattel is
not significant as regards the culpabil-
ity of offenders and because they
thought that the same punishment
should be imposed for attempted theft
and consummated theft, as they pro-
vided in the official draft.' I do not
know of any state which has such a
rule, and its general adoption in the fu-
ture seems very unlikely. But the drafts-
men, having rejected "asportation",
struggled, unsuccessfully I think, to
distinguish theft from noncriminal acts
and also to include criminal attempts
or some criminal attempts within theft.
'IIT]he ultimate issue", they say, is
"whether the behavior of the actor con-
stituted a negation or usurpation of
the owner's dominion". 9 They put the
case of one who animo lurandi enters
another's automobile, releases the brake
and turns on the ignition as falling
within theft, i.e., they omit only the
asportation. But granted that the series
of actions in the example constitutes a
"negation" of the owner's dominion,
3. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SociETY 37, 55
(1935).
4. BURNS IND. STArT § 10-3029.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (Proposed Of-
ficial Draft, 1962).
6. Id. § 223.1 (1) (emphasis supplied).
7. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent.
Drafts Nos. 1. 1953 at 65, and 2, 1954, at 61-
62).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1953, at 65, and 1954, at 61-62).
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conduct short of those particular acts
can be similarly appraised.
"Control" is often used in the law of
property to determine possession, and
in that context no manipulation or
contact is needed. Yet, it seems odd to
say that one who, in the absence of the
owner, stood animo furandi near an
automobile whose door was not locked
was in "control" of the automobile and
guilty of theft. On the other hand, one
who animo furandi took hold of the
handle of the door of an automobile,
opened it and sat inside the car would
certainly be acting in "negation" of
the owner's dominion. Turning on the
ignition seems unnecessary; indeed,
taking hold of the handle would seem
to suffice. Thus, at many points doubts
would arise as to where noncriminal
action ends or where "control" begins,
and there would be no established way
to resolve them objectively.
"Asportation" is an extremely pre-
cise test to differentiate the autempt
from the consummated crime; and al-
though the difference between attempt
and mere preparation is not a precise
one, common law formulas and case
law provide much help in determining
that question. 10 If both common law
"asportation" and "attempt" are aban-
doned, and at the same time, in almost
every state, attempts must he distin-
guished from the consummated crimes
as well as from noncriminal conduct,
how can those distinctions be made
and applied by use of "control"? The
above difficulties concerning "control"
raise serious doubts about the entire
plan of the new statutes, since that
term is central in most of them.
As regards those parts of the code
which are neither evident improve-
ments nor subject to serious doubts,
some portions are of questionable
merit. Two examples may be given:
first, the inclusion within theft of such
cases as Mitchneck, 130 Pa. Super.
433, 193 A. 463 (1938). The defend-
ant in that case, by agreement with his
employees, withheld from their wages
certain sums that were to be paid by
him to the commissary where they pur-
chased supplies, but he did not make
the promised payment. A Pennsylvania
court set aside a conviction of embez-
zlement on the ground that he had not
converted the money of another. It is
clear that the draftsmen of the new
provisions wished to bring such cases
within the orbit of theft, but even if
the courts reach the intended result,
one may doubt whether that change is
an improvement over the old law. The
second example concerns the adoption
of what was previously a small minor-
ity view, namely, that making a prom-
ise to pay, but intending not to pay, is
criminal fraud (theft). The doubt here
relates to the possibility of abuse. Able
judges have expressed opposite views
on this question, and although in prin-
ciple most students of criminal law
probably approve this extension of
common law fraud, further study of
the problem is needed to remove the
lingering apprehension that careless or
optimistic businessmen may be prose-
cuted.
There is one very important aspect
of the Model Penal Code and of some
of the new statutes that must be
brought into focus if the sweeping na-
ture of the substantive changes they
have introduced is to be understood,
namely, the provisions regarding pun-
ishment, especially the application of
the same penalties to all the forms of
theft, with additional discretionary pro-
visions increasing the punisbment tor
repeaters, professional offenders and
others. The basis of these provisions is
the Model Penal Code's classification
of offenses into felonies, misdemeanors
and violations, and the subclassification
of felonies into three degrees and mis-
demeanors into two. There is doubtless
much to be said for this plan, which
was largely the work of a distinguished
criminologist, the late Professor Paul
Tappan; but it has been severely criti-
cized on the ground that the initial
maxium punishment is mandatory in
all cases and that the plan is too rigid,
encouraging administrative inflexibil-
ity rather than individualization." The
British Criminal Law Revision Com-
mittee has taken quite a different direc-
tion from that of the American Law
Institute.12 And the New York penal
code, which provides five degrees of
felony and three degrees of misde-
meanor, also differs from the Model
Penal Code in subjecting extortion to a
higher penalty than any other form of
theft.' 3 Everyone agrees that the maze
of penalties that still prevails in most
states should be done away with, but
this important problem seems to re-
quire further study to discover the best
alternative plan.
It is clear that the criminal receiver is
the heart of the theft problem. Not
only large-scale professional theft but
also countless thefts by juveniles and
occasional offenders depend on the
availability of a regular market-and
to provide that service is the crucial
function of the criminal receiver. It
also is clear why it is very difficult to
convict criminal receivers and, further,
that the habitual offender laws are not
adequate, that, indeed, in many cases
they are not even relevant. Ilave the
code and the recent enactments made
adequate use of this knowledge?
The code treats receiving stolen
property, if the defendant is in the
business of buying or selling stolen
10. HALL, GENERAL PRIIcirLES or CRIMINAL
LAW 578-584 (2d ed. 1960).
11. Rubin, Senteneing an d Correctional
Treatment Under the Lain Institute's Model
Penal Code, 46 A.B.A.J. 994 (1960).
12. See infra at note 14.
13. NEW YORE PENAL LAW § 155.40 (Mc-
Kinney).
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property, in the same manner as it
treats theft of property valued at over
$500, i.e., as a third-degree felony
(223.1(2a)) for which the maximum
punishment is five-years' imprison-
ment. It also provides for a discretion-
ary sentence of five additional years
(6.07(3)) if the defendant has been
previously convicted of two felonies or
of one felony and two misdemeanors,
or if he has been shown to have been a
professional criminal whose income
cannot be accounted for through legiti-
mate means. But large-scale dealers in
stolen property have rarely been con-
victed two or three times; moreover,
since their business was taken into ac-
count in 223.1 (2a), it is doubtful that
it can again be considered as the basis
for an extended sentence. Section
165.45 of the New York penal code
makes both theft of over $250 and
theft by a pawnbroker or one in the
business of buying, selling or otherwise
dealing in property class E felonies
(four years). Section 165.50 deals with
theft of over $1,500 (class D, seven
years), but does not mention dealers.
Thus, the only distinctive treatment of
dealers is to place the small operators
in the minimal class of felony. Section
3252 of Michigan's proposed bill class-
ifies receiving by a dealer of property
which does not exceed $],000 as a
class A misdemeanor (one year), and
Section 3251 classifies receiving of
property worth over $1,000 by a dealer
as a class C felony (five years). Each
of these sections makes receiving a less
serious crime than other theft of
property of like value! Excepting Wis-
consin's, the other recent statutes do
not distinguish dealers from other re-
ceivers or receiving from larceny. In
sum, except for the above halting and
sometimes dubious "advances" and
the improvement of the law concerning
proof of mens rea in the case of deal-
ers, the traditional approach of treat-
ing receivers and thieves alike and
making the gravity of the receiver's of-
fense depend on the value of the prop-
erty still prevails. The central role of
the receiver in the field of theft is ig-
nored when no distinction is made be-
tween receiver and thief, and basing the
gravity of the offense of receiving on
the value of the property received ig-
nores the fact that a junk dealer
who buys stolen goods from the neigh-
borhood boys commits harm far greater
than that designated by the small value
of the stolen property in the individual
transactions.
The vagueness of "control" and the
abandonment of common law distinc-
tions among various types of theft and
related crimes in favor of the general
notion of "theft" raise the old issue of
codification versus a more circumspect
improvement of the criminal law. One
is apt to think of the principle of legal-
ity as a protection of accused persons.
But, as noted above, broad terms and
classifications may aid convicted of-
fenders; and convictions also are made
more difficult by employing the term
"theft" in unfamiliar ways, by the
wide use of "intent to deprive perma-
nently" (which may increase the diffi-
culty of convicting embezzlers who,
under the present rules, need not have
had that intention), by blurring the
distinction between attempt and the
consummated crime, and so on.
Legal Analysis
and Sociolegal Research
Many who cherish the principle of
legality will be apprehensive of the
abandonment of the common law
standard of precision in favor of broad
statutory definitions of new terms. But
they may nonetheless think the time
has arrived for the adoption of new
legislation in this complicated field.
The consequent dilemma can be re-
solved by following sound methods of
study as regards both legal analysis
and relevant sociolegal research.
The lawyer's primary tasks will be
(a) eliminating archaic survivals and
cleaning up current statutes, (b)
bringing cognate provisions in the re-
tained law into such juxtaposition as
will facilitate the perception of existing
classifications and an appraisal of the
various sanctions, and (c) designing a
statute, if one is needed, to cope with
procedural difficulties. These initial
steps also would have the not insignifi-
cant advantage of informing the mem-
bers of the Bar of exactly what was
going on and of preparing them for the
next step-the appraisal of proposed
wide-ranging reforms so that informed
judgments could be made as to which
proposals were sound, which unsound,
and which would require factual and
other study before they could be evalu-
ated with warranted assurance. In this
connection, it is interesting and in-
structive to see some of the directions
taken by the British Criminal Law Re-
vision Committee, who, of course, were
familiar with the Model Penal Code
and recent American statutes. In addi-
tion to fixing the maximum penalty for
receiing and extortion (14 years)
higher than that for larceny, embezzle-
ment and fraud (10 years), and hav-
ing a single set of penalties rather than
two sets, the committee rejected the use
of "theft" as a unifying concept; in-
deed, they did not place even obtaining
property by false pretenses in that cate-
gory, but limited "theft" to larceny
and embezzlement. They decided that,
"To create a new offense of theft to in-
clude conduct which ordinary people
would find difficult to regard as theft
would be a mistake."' 4 The committee
also thought there would be consequent
procedural difficulties in charging theft
by false pretenses, and their report re-
veals a disinclination to abandon com-
mon law precision.
As for sociolegal research, many
have urged the desirability of large-
scale efforts to provide much needed
knowledge. Before making those ef-
forts, however, it should be recognized
that "research" can mean almost any-
thing and that it can be wasteful and
even dangerous unless critical attention
is paid to certain elementary facts.
During 1932 and the quarter of a cen-
tury that followed, several books based
on sociolegal research were published,
each written by one or two scholars
who performed their own research, 15
and I think anyone who reads these
books will agree that they made very
important contributions; indeed, some
have become classics. Then, the large
foundations entered the field and we
now have million-dollar research proj.
ects, equipped with all imaginable
paraphernalia. Their results are far
more detailed than the earlier books,
and they may be superior in other re-
spects. But one may entertain serious
14. CmNaD. No. 2977, at 20, 1 38 (1966). For
other criticism of the "lumping together"
tendency, see Kuh. A Prosecutor Cov dsers
the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUX. L. REV. 613,
620 (1963).
15. BERLE & MEANS, I-E T MoDERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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doubts about the large-scale projects
and wonder whether we cannot use our
resources more effectively.
First, it seems clear that the signifi-
cance of sociolegal research depends
more on art than on science and that,
unlike research in the physical and
biological sciences, where many time-
consuming operations can be safely
dclcgatcd to inexperienced assistants,
almost every step in sociolegal re-
search depends on the judgment, imag-
ination and knowledge of the re-
searcher. I do not mean to draw a hard
line between art and science since both
are exemplified in scientific work of a
high order. But one of the unhappy
facts about some of the large-scale re-
search projects is that they culminate in
descriptions of piles of raw data or of
data organized along trivial lines,
while the modest research of a single
investigator may culminate in very sig-
nificant discoveries. When millions of
dollars have gone into a research proj-
ect, raising proportionate expectations,
and when what emerges by way of nov-
elty is a tiny mouse and the laboring
of what was already known or easily
could be discovered in conversation
with a half dozen experts, it is neces-
sary to question reliance on large-scale
research to solve our problems. An ob-
vious alternative is to build small re-
search groups around very talented
persons who may be expected to pro-
duce significant results and also to
train the other members of the team,
some of whom may have the potential
to become great sociolegal researchers.
Second, researchers find what they
are able to recognize as relevant, and
they interpret their findings in the
light of their preferences, their "ideol-
ogy" in the current mode. One who is
firmly persuaded that poverty is the
cause of crime, that punishment is ob-
solete, that all criminal acts are inexor-
ably determined, that the criminal law
represents the interest of a ruling class,
that deterrence and justice are myths
and so on-such a researcher finds the
data that reflect and sustain his philo.
sophical bias. The point is not that
sound research and evaluation are im-
possible because everyone has a philos-
ophy, but that the researcher's philo-
sophical preferences should be stated
at the outset, not left for speculative
reading between the lines of his report.
Third, in many, if not all, research
groups, there should be included an
opposition group, the "devil's advo-
cates"' if you please, whose function
would be to criticize the policies, meth-
ods and findings of the majority and to
carry on limited studies based on op-
posed policies and methods with a view
to discovering if other findings are de-
fensible. There are other ways to guard
against bias in sociolegal research.
For example, a committee of consult-
ants, selected because they are known
to represent opposing views, might
serve as a council to whom preliminary
reports would be made at various
stages of the research. These measures
may complicate the tasks of research,
but who can doubt that they would
stimulate thinking and the improve-
ment of plans of investigation? They
also would expose the lack of knowl-
edge regarding many questions, and
this would highlight the importance of
experience and sound judgment in solv-
ing problems and dispel the illusion
that there is some sort of magic in so.
cial research that can solve all prob-
lems.
Fourth, after the above safeguards
have been provided, a basic prelimi-
nary question must be confronted,
namely, what is feasible? For example,
the question of deterrence is an elusive
one, since it is impossible to discover
with any significant degree of accuracy
how many persons did not commit a
certain crime because of the presence
or the absence of a particular law or
sanction. Equal difficulties beset the de-
termination of trends-whetlier crime
has increased or decreased. Sufficient
data to resolve a problem cannot al-
ways be discovered, or the cost of
doing so may be prohibitive. Without
implying that venturesome studies
should not be attempted, it seems plain
that if sociolegal research is to enlist
continued public support, it should be
largely concentrated on problems re-
garding which it is probable that defi-
nite, significant results can be reached.
It is also much clearer than it was
thirty-five years ago that in sociolegal
research, the motto must be: "Divide if
you hope to conquer." It cannot be ov-
eremphasized, and therefore bears re-
peating, that there are occasional and
professional thieves and there are per-
sons who may commit theft only once;
there are different kinds of theft, rang-
ing from petty neighborhood theft to
shoplifting to the skilled pickpocket
and on to the large-scale theft of jew-
elry or furs; there are various types of
automobile theft, including the joy-
ride; receivers range from the lady
who once in a lifetime is tempted into
buying a stolen ring to the professional
receiver who does a million-dollar-a-
year business; embezzlement ranges
from ten-dollar conversions by depart-
ment store clerks to very large defalca-
tions by brokers and bankers. Similar
distinctions are to be drawn regarding
"fraud" and the offenders tagged by
that general term. One of the doubts
about the leveling provisions of the
new antitheft enactments is that the
use of omnibus concepts such as
"theft" and "control" may, despite
the best of intentions, obscure impor-
tant social differences.
Fifth, the progress of comparative
criminal law has revealed the impor-
tance of taking careful account of for-
eign experience. Knowledge of the
ways foreign codes handle burglary,
receiving stolen goods, professional or
habitual offenders, the effect of intoxi-
cation on criminal liability and other
problems is very helpful; even a small
state could make excellent use of one
or two experts in foreign penal law.
Sixth, the publication of any re-
search pointed toward major legal re-
forms should give ample space to mi-
nority opinions. In this regard, a com-
parison of the narrowly restricted re-
ports of the A.L.I. on the Model Penal
Code with the twelve or more bulky
volumes compiled by the Germans en-
gaged in a similar project is illuminat-
ing and not at all comforting as re-
gards the American publications. Not
only do opinions differ very sharply re-
garding many problems of criminal
law, but also reform of the criminal
law should be a continuing effort; for
no sooner is one project completed, no
matter how admirable it may seem to
be, than its defects and deficiencies are
recognized and the need for further
study becomes apparent. It is a great
waste of talent, time and money when,
on each occasion of renewed study, we
start from scratch, without benefit of
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the discussions of able persons who en-
gaged in similar past studies. Indeed, it
is strange that in the country which,
more than any other, recognizes the
importance of the dissenting judicial
opinion, the largest legal research in-
stitute did not allow any space in its
reports on a penal code for the expres-
sion of the dissenting views of partici-
pants in that work.
Poverty, Theft and
Punishment
The administration of the criminal
law, especially as regards theft, de-
pends ultimately on the climate of
public opinion and sometimes even
more on the opinion of articulate intel-
lectuals concerning such questions as
causation, responsibility and punish.
meat. When it is frequently said, even
in the highest political quarters and es-
pecially with reference to widespread
looting, that poverty is the cause of
theft or an important causal factor, the
implication is that the law can play
only a superficial role and that until
poverty is eliminated we must expect
no decrease in the volume of theft.
This is an engaging but far from
novel thesis. Many criminologists have
studied the relation of economics to
crime, particularly theft. The theory
that capitalism is the basic cause is lit-
tle heard nowadays, perhaps because
the Soviet Union's criminal law, after
fifty years of communism, has become
more punitive than ever, indicating
that crime is a major problem there. In
1961 and 1962, "making or passing
counterfeit money or securities (Arti.
cle 87), violation of rules on currency
transactions (Article 88), stealing state
or social property on an especially
large scale (Article 93-1)" and other
crimes were subjected to the death pen-
alty.16 In addition, despite the savagery
of capital punishment for property
crimes and in the face of their recent
espousal of legality and the prohibition
of retroactivity in their new penal
code, the Russians have applied the
death penalty retroactively in cases of
theft. There have been many studies of
the relationships between poverty and
crime and between economic depres-
sions and crime, but the results are
conflicting and uncertain; some of
them indicate that more crimes against
property are committed during periods
of prosperity than during depressions.
As regards all of this research, the
publication of the late E. H. Suther-
land's White Collar Crime (1949)
raised a basic challenge. Sutherland
maintained that none of the crimino-
logical studies on causation was valid
because the property crimes of middle-
and upper-class persons, especially
businessmen, had not been taken into
account. Unfortunately, his book was
marred in ways that aroused serious
criticism. The meaning of the term
"white collar crime" was not consistent
throughout his work, so it was impossi-
ble to use the concept in research. He
accumulated what he called "convic-
tions" of many corporations without
distinguishing administrative actions
from decisions of criminal courts, and
in many instances he did not even re-
quire a conviction. His claim that as a
result of legislative bias in their favor,
upper-class offenders are tried by ad-
ministrative tribunals or civil courts
rather than by criminal courts17 was
far from proved; in fact, the courts
seem to be especially lenient with de-
partment store clerks who commit
petty thefts.18 He also showed a lack of
appreciation of the distinctive charac-
ter' of "corporate crime" and of the
functions of administrative boards,
and he treated strict liability offenses
as though they were indistinguishable
from genuine crimes in which mens
rea is essential.
But if we set aside these dubious and
unsupported aspects of Sutherland's
book, it must be recognized that his
emphasis on the commission of prop-
erty crimes by upper- and middle-class
persons1 9 was an important corrective
of the opinion that poverty is the cause
of theft, even if it seems odd that it
was necessary for criminologists to be
informed that large-scale frauds and
embezzlements are very frequent and
that they are not committed by poor,
uneducated persons. Such a causal the-
sis, which is an application of a scien-
tific concept of cause-in this case the
covariation of variables, e.g., the law
that gases expand in proportion to in-
crease in temperature-is extremely
difficult, perhaps impossible, to estab-
lish with regard to social problems. It
is impossible to isolate one social fac-
tor from all the others; and it is there-
fore impossible, by varying the facts
concerning particular factors, to dis-
cover the causal efficacy of any one of
them.
Consequently, the argument for cau-
sation shifted to a set of multiple fac-
tors, e.g., the combination of poverty,
unemployment, limited education and
broken homes. But this approach also
encountered difficulties. All persons
designated by those criteria do not
commit crimes. Indeed, a large major-
ity of them are not known to have
committed any crime; and, on the
other hand, many thefts and other
crimes are committed by middle- and
upper-class persons who, so far as is
known, do not have any of the selected
characteristics. The multiple-causation
theory has been extended to include
many additional factors whose com-
bined operation is said to be responsi-
ble for crime; but that amounts to say-
ing that the American way of life is
the cause of crime in America. If that
is the upshot of research on multiple
causation, actual improvement-not
just talk about it-is extremely difficult
to produce if, indeed, it is not utopian.
Again, the argument shifted, this
time away from poverty and unemploy-
ment (that would make the crime rate
of many so-called under-developed
countries the highest in the world,
which it is not) to the great disparity
in wealth betwen the poor and the rich.
This carries some persuasiveness, no
doubt, but the difficulty with this for-
mulation is that- human nature being
what it is, there is not only a gap be-
tween rich and poor, but also between
the poor and the skilled workers,
between lower-middle, middle and
upper-middle classes, between the mil-
lionaire and the multimillionaire and,
finally, between each of us and those
16. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
cEnuvz 61 - 62 (1966): and see Hazard, Soviet
Socialisrm and Embezzlement, 26 WAsH. L. REV.
301 (1951).
17. T, SNUTHERLAND PAPEaS 168-169 (Cohen,
Lindesmith & Schuessler eds., 1956).
18. See Robin, The Corporate and Judicial
Disposition of Employee Thieves, 1967 Wis.
L. REv. 685.
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ubiquitous neighbors of ours, "the
Joneses".
Opposed to all of these versions of
mechanical causation is a view of
Ccause" that is dominant in criminal
law, namely, that we deal with persons
who cause changes to occur by con-
sciously doing certain things, e.g., by
pressing a bell or taking someone's
chattel. The cause, in short, is a human
being characterized by his concern
with reasons for acting in certain
ways.
The thesis that poverty is the cause
of crime often coincides with the
dogma that, in law, rehabilitation is
the only rational end to be pursued.
That thesis, however, runs counter to
certain hard facts. There is the fact
that embezzlement in the Post Office is
regularly prosecuted and that embez-
zlement is lower there than in almost
any other business.20 There is the fact
that the conviction of prominent in-
come-tax violators definitely deters
that sort of offense. There are well-
known facts regarding the sharp
increase of crime in Boston, Liv-
erpool and Copenhagen when the po-
lice went on strike or were kept from
performing their duties.2 1 The rehabili-
tationist thesis runs counter to the fact
that there are professional offenders,
perpetrators of large-scale jewelry, fur
and security thefts, as well as emhez-
zlers who are brokers or other "pillars
of society" and are normal, much
smarter than most men and frequently
better educated. For such offenders, re-
habilitation by the personnel of most
prisons is so remote a possibility as to
be irrelevant. And if it is superstitious
to treat these people as they deserve to
be treated, and illusory to treat them
in ways believed to deter potential of-
fenders, then nothing remains but to
abandon all legal controls.
The rejection of dogmatic rehabilita-
tionism does not in the least imply that
there should not be an important place
for correctional treatment in our svs-
tem of criminal justice. Everyone now-
adays hopes that we will soon acquire
the knowledge needed to rehabilitate
offenders. 22 The present position is that
any defensible system of criminal law
must also take account of deterrence,
and, most important if emphasis is to
be placed on any single goal, the law
and its administration must be just,
resting on the moral validity of the
criminal law and the treatment of of-
fenders as human beings. In short,
"punishment should enhance the indi-
vidual's sense of personal value". 23
Nor does anything said above imply
that prosecutors and judges should
shut their eyes to the facts of poverty,
unemployment and broken homes. We
do not need to wait for criminologists
to prove that these are causes in any
rigorous sense of that term to accept
the thesis that a combination of these
factors may tempt more people than
would otherwise be tempted to commit
crimes against property. Nor does it
mean that because a man is of middle-
or upper-class status, courts should be
insensitive to his situation, its pressures
and temptations. But the difference be-
tween being tempted to act and being
caused to move is of infinite signifi-
cance as regards personal responsibil-
ity. It implies that there is no neces-
sary or inevitable connection between
poverty and crime and that, e.g., im-
proved family life and education in
moral values can make an important
contribution; hence poverty and unem-
ploysoent call for mitigation, not the
exculpation that the law extends to in-
fants and psychotic persons. The rela-
tivity of "poverty" is recognized along
wim the fallacy of the propaganda that
when there is no more poverty (what-
ever that might mean) crimes against
property will disappear. Accordingly,
it is the prosecutor's duty to use the
criminal law in ways that inculcate re-
spect for human beings and those ele-
ments of personality that are called
''property".
But it has been objected by an
American sociologist that, "If it is true
that so many of us have at one time or
another committed some criminal of-
fense, then a retributive and negative
attitude towards those who have been
caught is not only illogical, it is hypo-
critical as well."'24 I think this is falla-
cious for several reasons. As regards
many acts that seem to be formally
criminal, such as the occasional use of
the company's postage stamps on per-
sonal mail, there is a sort of under-
standing that although such conduct is
not approved, it is not criminal; if one
cannot say there is consent to such
petty appropriation, it is, in practice,
an instance of the de nimis doctrine.
It is also fallacious to imply, if that
was the intention, that if everyone
sometime in his life has committed a
theft, everybody is a thief. But most se-
riously, the above statement reflects a
failure to recognize that one of the
principal functions of the criminal law
is to strengthen everybody's moral
fiber and to inhibit common desires
that, if acted on, would injure other
persons' interests. Even habitual of-
fenders and major felons sometimes
acknowledge their culpability, and
every thoughtful person has often pun-
ished himself in acute awareness of the
gaps between his conscience and his
actions. From a somewhat different
point of view, it has been pointed out
that some acts are so violent or repul-
sive that they will not often be commit-
ted even if there are no legal controls,
but that as regards stealing, the sup-
port of the criminal law is necessary.
25
"When we travel by train," said the
late Sir Alexander Maxwell, Chairman
of the British Prison Commission, "we
most of us intend to pay our fares, but
the presence of the ticket collector at
the barrier just clinches the matter! "26
Since everyone needs the authority and
the moral instruction of the legal insti-
tution, the rehabilitationist dogma is,
at bottom, an attack on the conditions
that are necessary for the maintenance
of civilized life. But, as stated, al-
though one rejects the philosophy of
20. IALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 228-130
(2d ed. 1952).
21 Andenaes, The General Preventive Ef-
fects of Pv nishment, 114 U. or PA. L. R1Ev.
961-962 (19i6) "In face of extremist claims
about the futility of punishment it is well to
remember such facts as: of 81,012 people
committed to prison between 1930 and 1939
in the U.K. 65,147 (804 per cent) had not
returned there by 1941." Flew, Crime or
Disease? 5 BRIT. J. SoC'Y 50 (1954).
22. "We know as yet very little about what
kinds of treatment are most suitable for what
kinds of criminals and even less about how,
or whether, the rate of success varies accord-
ing to the duration and intensity." Andenaes,
id. at 971. "Clear evidence that reformative
measures do in fact reform would be very
welcome." WooroN. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL
PATHOLocY 335 (1959).
23. Miller supra note 2, at 101.
24. Wolfgang, id. at 41.
25. "The average normal housewife does
not need to be deterred from poisoning her
husband, but possibly does need a deterrent
from shoplifting." Wilkins, quoted by Anden-
aes, supra note 21, at 958.
26. Quoted, supra note 2. at 170.
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determinism and the dogma that reha-
bilitation is the only rational purpose
to be sought, it is also true, and easy to
see as regards theft, that there is no
place for vindictiveness and that all
available opportunities for rehabilita-
tion that are consistent with justice
and deterrence should be used.
Social Prophylaxis
Thus we come to the final and in
some ways the most important and dif-
ficult question considered in this dis-
cussion, namely, the possibility of deal-
ing with theft in ways that advance
what might be called "social prophy.
laxis". In eighteenth-century England,
hundreds of convicted thieves were
transported first to the American colo-
nies and after 1776 to Australia. Stat-
utes on vagrancy, military service and
other methods of diverting restless
youths from criminal careers were also
utilized. Today, the deportation of citi-
zens would he harsh, indeed, unthink-
able. The New York Court of Appeals
in Fenster v. Leary, 229 N.E. 2d 426
(1967), held the state's vagrancy law
unconstitutional, as punishment of a
status; and recent decisions reversing
convictions of alcohol addicts for disor-
derly conduct have added to the
abandonment of the traditional use of
the criminal law as an instrument of
social prophylaxis. The current con-
cern for the rights of persons accused
of crime or charged with juvenile de-
linquency also is believed by many to
have increased society's need for pro-
tection. At the same time, efforts to en-
courage enrollment in job training cen-
ters and other calls for voluntary co-
operation seem doomed to ineffective-
ness if only because of the small num-
ber of persons who respond.
It is probably not a mere coinci-
dence that the expansion of the concepts
of "mental disease" and "addiction"
and the consequent use of "civil com.
mittient" and other noncriminal
procedures have been increasingly, if
not deliberately, employed to offset the
restrictions on use of the criminal law
and to meet the enlarged social need.
But this raises the threat of a therapeu-
tic state directed by a bureaucracy
composed of experts who claim to be
able to recognize potentially dangerous
persons (although they did not violate
any law) and seem eager to apply com-
pulsory treatment in "hospitals" that
may have far less concern for their pa-
tients than obtains for convicts in en-
lightened prisons. When psychiatrists
of high repute insist that most of the
population is mentally diseased, the
spectre of the therapeutic state stands
at every man's elbow. The literature on
sociopathology, the abuse of the civil
commitment of allegedly mentally "dis-
eased" persons, and the so-called sexual
psychopath laws are eloquent witnesses
of what is involved.
Is there any way out of this impasse
-a mounting crime problem on the
one hand and, on the other, the expan-
sion of the concepts of "disease" and
"dangerousness" to gain acceptance of
preventive coercion? Although the use
of educational and ameliorative mea-
sures is outside the scope of the present
discussion, it is evident that there are
limits on what can or should be done.
Within the realm of the lawyer's spe.
cial competence, what he may opt for,
so far as coercive measures are con-
cerned, are plans and procedures that
are consistent with the values of a
democratic legal order. I have referred
to the traditional functions of the crim-
inal law to educate and protect. But we
are now constrained to seek a wider
use of legal controls-one that will
cope with the insistent problem of so-
cial prophylaxis. Is there any large-
scale method that can be employed that
is not only constitutional but also con-
sistent with American sensibilities?
This is an extremely difficult problem
and it is with considerable diffidence
that I make the following suggestion.
One of the several possible attacks
on this problem concerns the millions
of petty thefts committed annually by
unemployed, unskilled persons; and
the relevant question is whether,
among them, a class of offenders can
be definitely marked out and selected
for compulsory training in vocational
centers where they are taught a trade
and later helped to find employment.
The maximum period of detention
might be three years, which is at pres-
ent provided in some states on second
conviction for petty larceny.
The nature of this offense, especially
when accompanied by poverty and un-
employment, the fact that public emo-
tions are not aroused, and other dis-
tinctive facts make it feasible to elimi.
nate punitive methods except as to de.
tention. Retributionists, deeply con-
cerned as they are that punishment be
just, may think three years' confine-
ment for the commission of a petty mis-
demeanor is harsh. A very humane ad-
ministration of the program might re-
solve that difficulty. On the other hand,
for the complete rehabilitationist, the
above proposal will seem far too re-
stricted, even if it does not in the least
imply that felons should not be given
.vocational training. But, as seen. reha-
bilitation alone (even if knowledge of
how to do that becomes available), is
not adequate as regards some crimes
and types of offenders; and in any
case, even if the rehabilitationists were
right, and deterrence and justice were
relics of the past, they would still en-
counter public opinion as a barrier to
their sweeping program. Finally, those
,who think punishment has an impor.
tant function in criminal law, find
support in the statement by Attorney
General Aulie of Norway that young
offenders who are released after ques.
tioning "regard the intervention of the
police as a temporary inconvenience,
of negligible importance". As his com-
patriot, Professor Andenaes, adds, "the
humanizing of penal practice must be
kept within certain limits if it is not to
lead to an undermining of respect for
law and authority". 27
27. Andenaes, Gene-al Prevento-Iounusion
or Reality?, 43 J. Calm. L. C. & P. S. 195 (1952).
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